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ABSTRACT: Although works councils are a core element of the German system of
industrial relations, there is little reliable information on their incidence and cover-
age. This paper uses data from the nationally representative IAB establishment
panel to fill this gap. We examine the frequency of works councils by establish-
ment size and broad sector for eastern and western Germany, while at the same
time charting the determinants of their presence. Furthermore, we identify newly
established works councils and provide the first econometric analysis of the
circumstances of their formation. Finally, we discuss the consequences of our
findings for economic analysis of the institution and for public policy.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Trotz ihrer großen Bedeutung im deutschen System der
Arbeitsbeziehungen gibt es kaum gesicherte Erkenntnisse über den Verbreitungs-
und Deckungsgrad von Betriebsräten. Diese Forschungslücke soll in der
vorliegenden Arbeit durch Verwendung von repräsentativen Daten des IAB-
Betriebspanels geschlossen werden. Dabei wird die Verbreitung von Betriebsräten
nach Firmengröße und Sektoren sowie für West- und Ostdeutschland ebenso
analysiert wie deren Bestimmungsgründe. Zudem wird erstmals die Einrichtung
neuer Betriebsräte ökonometrisch untersucht. Abschließend erörtern wir die
ökonomischen und wirtschaftspolitischen Implikationen unserer Ergebnisse.
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JEL-CLASSIFICATION: J50, J53
* This study uses data from the IAB establishment panel, which is financially supported by the European
Social Fund. We are indebted to Holger Alda of the IAB for his help with the data. An earlier version of this
paper was presented in February 2002 at a workshop of the University of Witten/Herdecke; we thank the
participants for helpful comments.
a Prof. Dr. John T. Addison, Department of Economics, Moore School of Business, University of South
Carolina (U.S.A.), Columbia SC 29208, USA and IZA (Germany), ecceaddi@moore.sc.edu.
b Dr. Lutz Bellmann, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit and IZA
(Germany), Regensburger Straße 104, D-90478 Nürnberg, lutz.bellmann@iab.de.
c Prof. Dr. Claus Schnabel, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Lehrstuhl für Arbeitsmarkt-
und Regionalpoltik, Lange Gasse 20, D-90403 Nürnberg, claus.schnabel@wiso.uni-erlangen.de.
d Prof. Dr. Joachim Wagner, Universität Lüneburg, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, D-21332 Lüneburg,
HWWA and IZA (Germany), wagner@uni-lueneburg.de3
1. MOTIVATION
After protracted and highly controversial debate, the German Bundestag passed
the law reforming the pre-existing Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungs-
gesetz) on June 22, 2001. The new Works Constitution Reform Act (BetrVerf-
Reformgesetz) was approved by the Bundesrat on July 13, 2001, and became
effective on July 28, 2001, the day after its announcement in the Federal Law
Bulletin (Bundesgesetzblatt).
1
Section 1 of both the old and the new law provide for the election of works councils
in all establishments that normally have five or more employees with voting rights,
including three who are eligible to be works councilors. (Voting rights accrue to all
workers aged 18 years and above, and eligible employees are all workers who
have been employed by the firm for at least six months.) Although leaving this
particular size threshold unchanged, the new legislation seeks to facilitate works
council formation through simplified election procedures, inter al. This goal reflects
the limited penetration of works councils: in the majority of small establishments,
works council plants are a distinct minority, despite the low employment size
criterion and strict sanctions against employers who attempt to interfere with the
process of works council formation. Note also that the new legislation does make a
large number of formal changes that have the effect of increasing the power and
authority of works councils, with the stated aim of improving the economic
performance of the institution.
In short, the central aim of the German government in framing the legislation was
to increase the number (and reach) of works councils and thereby shrink the size
of what was termed a 'codetermination-free zone' by the Kommission Mitbe-
stimmung (Codetermination Commission), a high-level group of experts set up to
evaluate, among other things, the experience with the workings of the old Works
Constitution Act of 1972.
2 According to the Commission's final report, issued in
1 There is as yet no official English-language version of the law. The Works Constitution Reform
Act, documenting changes between the old and the new law, is published in Deutscher Bundes-
tag, 14. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 14/5741 vom 2. April 2001, and is available on the web at:
www.bundestag.de . The new Act is published in stand-alone form in the Bundesgesetzblatt
BGBl.I S. 1852, and is available on the web at: www.bma.bund.de/download/gesetze/
BetrVG.pdf. For a review of the evolution of workplace codetermination in Germany, the inno-
vations of the new law, and the controversies over costs and benefits of works councils, see
Addison, Bellmann, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2002.
2 See Kommission Mitbestimmung 1998. An English-language summary of the final report of the
Commission is available at: www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/endbericht/inhalt_e.html .4
1998, no less than 60 percent of all private-sector employees worked in firms
without a works council (and without employee representatives on the supervisory
board). Moreover, the Commission predicted a rise in this share for structural rea-
sons; in particular, the growing importance of new service-sector establishments
that are less likely than their manufacturing counterparts to have works councils.
Although works councils are a core element of the dual system of industrial rela-
tions in Germany, representative and up-to-date information on their frequency
and coverage is sparse. Thus, there are no official statistics on works councils,
and neither the union movement nor employers' associations publish pertinent
information. We note parenthetically that in its draft proposals for a new Works
Constitution Act, presented contemporaneously with the publication of the final
report of the Codetermination Commission, the Federation of German Unions
demanded registration of all enterprises without works councils in an accessible
public register (see Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 1998). This request did not
find its way into the new law.
The present paper seeks to fill this deficit in our knowledge by providing up-to-date
information on works council presence and coverage by establishment size inter-
val and by broad sector for both western and eastern Germany, using data from
the IAB establishment panel. Probit estimation of works council incidence is also
offered. In addition, we document the extent of newly-established works councils
and inquire into the circumstances of their formation.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II provides descriptive statistics on
works councils for 2000. Section III investigates the determinants of works council
presence. Section IV tackles the separate issue of newly-established councils. A
brief interpretative section concludes.
2. WORKS COUNCILS IN GERMANY:F ACTS AND FIGURES FOR 2000
The descriptive statistics presented in this section are derived from the IAB estab-
lishment panel. Each year since 1993 (1996), this panel has surveyed several
thousand establishments from all sectors of the economy in western (eastern)
Germany.
3 It is based on a stratified random sample – using strata for 16
industries and 10 size classes – from the population of all local production units
3 For more information on the IAB establishment panel see Kölling (2000). The data are confiden-
tial but not exclusive. Those interested in using them for scientific (noncommercial) research
should contact the second author via e-mail: lutz.bellmann@iab.de .5
with at least one employee covered by social insurance. (Due to the stratification
of the sample, the following material is based on weighted data.) Note that private-
sector undertakings which do not have insured employees cannot have a works
council under the law (recall the employment size threshold of five permanent
employees, noted earlier), so that from this perspective the restriction is not a
problem. Nevertheless, it is the case that a small number of public-sector
workplaces employing only civil servants, who are formally outside the social
insurance system, are excluded from the IAB panel. Information on the works
council status of establishments in western and eastern Germany is available for
the 1996, 1998, and 2000 waves of the panel. For present purposes, we focus on
the most recent figures for 2000.
Table 1: Distribution and Coverage of Works Councils by Establishment
Size in 2000 (in percent, establishments with five employees or more)
Western Germany Eastern Germany Germany Establishment size
interval (number of











































Average 16.6 54.1 15.4 47.1 16.3 53.0
Notes: Presence refers to the share of establishments with a works council.
Coverage denotes the share of employees working in an establishment
with a works council.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 8 (western Germany) and 5 (eastern
Germany), 2000.
Table 1 reports information on works council presence (defined as the proportion
of establishments with a works council) and coverage (the proportion of
employees working in establishments with works councils) for the German
economy as a whole, and for western and eastern Germany, by six establishment
size classes. Only establishments with five or more employees are included in the6
sample due to the legal threshold mentioned above. On the basis of this
restriction, works councils are encountered in just one in every six German
establishments, and this share is only slightly higher in western than eastern
Germany. Works council presence tends to increase sharply with establishment
size, from about one in ten in the smallest size class with less than 21 employees
to about nine in ten among the large firms with more than 500 employees. The big
picture is rather similar in western and eastern Germany. Clearly, the positive
association between establishment size and works council presence produces a
value for coverage that considerably exceeds that for incidence – slightly more
than one-half of all employees in Germany work in establishments that have a
works council.
Table 2: Distribution and Coverage of Works Councils by Sector in 2000
(in percent, establishments with five employees or more)
Western Germany Eastern Germany Germany
Sector
Presence Coverage Presence Coverage Presence Coverage
























All sectors 16.6 54.1 15.4 47.1 16.3 53.0
Note: See notes to Table 1.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 8 (western Germany) and 5 (eastern
Germany), 2000.
Both works council presence and coverage varies widely by sector. Table 2 shows
that nearly two-thirds of all establishments in the public sector have a works
council (termed a Personalrat) compared to only one in eight establishments in the
private sector (where the works council is termed a Betriebsrat). Although these
figures do not differ materially between western and eastern Germany, we find a
remarkable difference in works council incidence when we split the private sector
into its manufacturing (including construction) and services components. In west-7
ern Germany, works council presence is higher in manufacturing than in services,
and folklore has it that the shrinking share of the manufacturing sector combined
with a growing share of private services is one of the main reasons for the long-run
decline of works council presence in (western) Germany. By contrast, in eastern
Germany works council presence is much smaller in manufacturing than in serv-
ices, while works council coverage in manufacturing is about 22 percentage points
lower than in western Germany.
Table 3: Distribution of Works Councils by Establishment Size and Sector
in 2000 (share of establishments with five employees or more that
have a works council, in percent)


















































































Average 13.4 11.8 62.9 8.7 14.3 67.4 12.4 12.2 63.5
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 8 (western Germany) and 5 (eastern
Germany), 2000.
Table 3 combines information on establishment size class and sector. In the public
sector, about one-half of the smallest units have a Personalrat, and nearly all of
the larger units with more than 100 employees have the institution. In the private
sector in both western and eastern Germany, works council presence tends to
increase with firm size in manufacturing and private services. Observe that in both
regions works councils are a very rare species in the smallest establishments in
the manufacturing sector.8
Since the public sector can be regarded as a special case where works councils
are more or less part of the organization (and bureaucracy), it may be sensible to
concentrate on the private sector and on employees' decisions to establish a
works council there. The broad picture regarding works council presence and
coverage in the private sector of the German economy at the start of the new
millennium can be summarized as follows: works councils are elected in only one
of every eight establishments, although this frequency increases with establish-
ment size. It is larger for manufacturing than services in western Germany, and
conversely for eastern Germany. But the positive relation between establishment
size and works council presence means that the number of workers covered by
councils is greater than the incidence of councils: no less than 47.5 (37) percent of
all employees in western (eastern) Germany are working in works council
establishments.
3. THE DETERMINANTS OF WORKS COUNCIL PRESENCE
Why is it that so many establishments that could have a works council under the
law do not in practice have one? Even if elections of works councils are neither
mandated nor automatic, in a council-free regime all that is strictly necessary to
bring about an election and thence a works council is for a small group of at least
three employees (or a union that claims to have at least one member in the plant)
to call for a works meeting where an electoral board will be elected which will in
turn call the election, implement it, and announce the result. The requirements are
hardly onerous. Given the far-reaching codetermination rights of the works council,
the interesting question is why some establishments but not others are covered by
the institution.
The first answer to this question can be found as a byproduct in the study by Fitz-
Roy and Kraft (1987) of works councils' efficiency effects. The authors estimated a
probit equation for the probability of observing a works council using a small
sample of 61/62 firms in the metal working industry in 1977/79. They found that
the probability of works council presence significantly rises with the number of
employees and is lower in urban locations. Based on a much larger sample of
1,867 firms in the private sector in 1987, Frick and Sadowski (1995) presented
(without further amplification) a logistic regression in which the dependent variable
is a works council dummy. They reported that works councils are more likely the
larger/older the firm and the more qualified its workforce. Firms experiencing
greater difficulty in recruiting qualified personnel and those with large swings in
labor demand were also found to be more likely to have a works council. Con-9
versely, works councils were less likely to be observed the higher the share of
female workers and the greater the proportion of part-timers in the work force.
In a comprehensive study specifically focused on the determination of works
council existence, Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner (1997) used data from a
regional sample of manufacturing establishments in Lower Saxony, namely, the
Hannover Firm Panel.
4 Using data from the first wave of the panel, administered in
1994, the authors link works council presence to structural, worker composition,
and participation variables. The key structural regressors are firm size (and its
square), firm age, branch plant status, and a detailed set of (30) industry dummies.
Our earlier descriptive material has already flagged the likely importance of estab-
lishment size. There are a number of factors that would lead us to anticipate a
positive association between size and works council presence. Most important
perhaps is the fact that the formal authority of the works council is increasing in
establishment size, thereby providing an increased incentive for workers to elect a
council in these circumstances. Governance considerations in larger plants might
also lead both sides to embrace the institution. Less positively, the more routinized
and regimented work settings commonly attributed to larger establishments might
encourage workers to demand works councils on defensive grounds. For its part,
branch plant status might capture any demonstration effect that the existence of a
works council in a parent firm might have on its affiliate. Older plants might be
more likely to have councils because of their more established traditions of collec-
tive representation, and/or different managerial ethos and type of workers. (As a
practical matter, the Hannover panel does not provide a continuous measure of
age, but rather information on whether the plant was established prior to 1960 or
otherwise.)
Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner argue that certain characteristics of the workforce
(and the workplace) may be expected to index a taste for representation on the
part of employees. As cases in point, they identify the proportions of blue-collar
workers, shift workers, females, and part-timers. It is postulated that the two
former (latter) variables are likely to be positively (negatively) associated with
works council presence for reasons that reflect both worker choice and organiza-
tional stability considerations.
4 The population of the (four-wave) Hannover panel is all manufacturing firms with at least 5
employees. The sample of establishments is stratified by firm size, with over-sampling of larger
plants. The first wave of the panel contains data on 1,025 establishments. For further information
on this and the remaining three waves, see Brand, Carstensen, Gerlach, and Klodt (1996).10
Finally, the authors seek to test the argument that both direct and indirect parti-
cipation variables – in the form of dummies for teamworking and profit sharing,
respectively – might represent a substitute in the eyes of the workforce for the
machinery of the works council, even if one of the functions of the works council
encompasses codetermination rights in the implementation of such arrangements.
They also consider profit-sharing schemes for managers, to test one aspect of the
management pressure hypothesis advanced by FitzRoy and Kraft (1987, 1990)
that such schemes will encourage management to seek compromise and thereby
lessen the need for workers to elect works councils on defensive grounds.
Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner present probit estimates for the total sample of
establishments and for a subsample of plants with 10-249 employees, within which
interval works council incidence runs the full gamut. Across both samples, there is
a consistent relation between the structural variables and works council presence.
That is, the probability of there being a council increases with establishment size
(albeit at a decreasing rate) and with the age of the plant, and is also greater if the
establishment is a branch plant. As far as the taste for collective representation
variables are concerned, these all behave in the expected manner, but only one of
these – namely, the inverse indicator provided by the share of female employees –
is statistically significant throughout. The effect of the participation variables is
interesting in that there is some suggestion that teamworking in particular is
associated with a reduced probability of observing a works council. The same is
true for the employee profit-sharing variable although in this case the coefficient
estimate is poorly determined across both samples. As far as profit-sharing
schemes for managers are concerned, these do not appear to reduce the
likelihood of works council presence; if anything the evidence is to the contrary.
5
The present empirical inquiry seeks to extend our former analysis, using data from
the IAB Establishment Panel. Unlike its Hannover counterpart, this panel is nation-
ally representative, covers sectors other than just manufacturing, and offers more
recent data. Although our empirical strategy follows the lines of our earlier study,
5 It should also be noted that the authors include a performance indicator - namely, an index of
establishment profitability - in the estimating equation. If works councils offer a vehicle for
appropriating rents, higher profitability may lead to works council formation. On the other hand,
successful rent seeking behavior may be manifested in lower profitability, producing an oppo-
sitely signed coefficient estimate for the performance indicator. As it happens, the association is
both negative and also well determined. However, the authors caution against simplistic rent
seeking interpretation of this finding given the cross section nature of the estimation, and instead
choose to emphasize that inclusion of the profits variable does not qualitatively alter any of the
other results.11
the specification of our empirical model will differ somewhat from it, reflecting both
data limitations and advantages of the IAB panel.
Commonalities include a quadratic in establishment size,abranch plant dummy,
the percentages of blue-collar, part-time, and female workers, a dummy variable
indicating whether or not the establishment has a profit sharing system for
employees, and a set of industry dummies. Our priors as regards the ceteris
paribus impact of these regressors have been discussed above.
Although establishment age is also included in the new model, its definition is
different than before. We can no longer define older firms as those established
before 1960 because we include firms from the new federal states in eastern Ger-
many, most of which were founded (or subject to major restructuring) after unifica-
tion in 1990. We now identify a young firm as one founded in 1995 or later. For the
reasons noted earlier, we anticipate a negative impact of this (dummy) variable on
works council presence. Furthermore, conventional wisdom decrees that the
decline in works council presence in Germany is in part due to the fact that
employees in newly established firms (notably, in the so-called 'new economy' and
in several service sectors) do not elect works councils. Including a dummy for
young firms allows us to test this conjecture.
Information on the percentage of shift workers, as well as the presence or
otherwise of teamwork and profit sharing schemes for managers is not available
from the current (2000) wave of the IAB panel. Furthermore, we did not include the
current profit situation as a regressor, reflecting potential endogeneity problems.
However, we introduce four new establishment characteristics and one regional
variable to augment our earlier empirical treatment. First, information on the legal
status of the firm is used. We deploy a dummy variable that takes the value of one
if an establishment is a family-name business (Einzelunternehmen or Personenge-
sellschaft). Typically, such firms are run by the owners themselves, and in a pater-
nalistic manner. Often these 'old-fashioned capitalists' are hostile to works councils
(and unions), and may manage to convince employees not to make use of their
legal right to elect a works council. Accordingly, we expect a negative influence of
this variable on works council presence. Second, we identify a foreign ownership
variable, which assumes the value of one if the establishment is foreign owned
(either entirely or in an amount exceeding 50 percent of equity), zero otherwise.
Here we have no single valued expectations. On the one hand, there is abundant
anecdotal evidence suggesting that multinational corporations headquartered in,
say, the United States or Japan often regard the German system of industrial12
relations as a locational disadvantage (or Standortnachteil). To this extent, they
may attempt to avoid the election of a works council. On the other hand, it might
well be the case that foreign firms that decide to operate facilities in Germany do
not share this vision, or that the employees of foreign-owned plants elect a works
council as a defensive mechanism. In any event, given the palpable lack of hard
evidence on the issue, inclusion of this variable is important in its own right. Third,
we include a variable indicating whether or not an establishment is covered by a
collective agreement with a union, governing pay and working conditions. The fact
that works councils play a key role in monitoring the implementation and function-
ing of collective agreements inside the establishment would lead us to expect a
positive association between these two worker representation institutions.
6 Fourth,
we include a variable indicating the presence (or otherwise) of an employee share
ownership scheme. This dummy complements the profit sharing regressor and is
justified on the same grounds.
Last but not least, we include a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the
establishment is located in eastern Germany, and zero for the case of western
Germany. Given that we control for establishment age, and in the light of the
descriptive results provided in section II, it follows that we have no distinct priors
regarding the ceteris paribus effect of an eastern German location on the proba-
bility of observing a works council.
As a first step, the empirical model was estimated across all establishments with
five or more employees in the IAB panel for which information on each variable is
available.
7 Estimates for Germany as a whole, and for eastern and western Ger-
many, are remitted to the Appendix Table. This exercise does not yield statistically
significant coefficient estimates of opposing sign for the same variable as between
the two regions. Given that we have no valid theoretical priors leading us to expect
differential regional effects of the covariates, we shall not comment on differences
between the two halves of the nation other than to note that including an east-west
dummy suffices as a control variable. Further, since the descriptive material
provided in section II indicates that the public sector differs fundamentally from the
6 For an interesting game-theoretic discussion of the joint determination of membership of an
employers association and works council presence, see Hübler and Jirjahn (2001).
7 While the descriptive information on works council incidence and coverage is based on weighted
data (taking care of the sampling frame using strata for 16 industries and 10 size classes), the
econometric investigation in this and the following section uses unweighted data and all empirical
models include the stratification variables (i.e. industry dummies and establishment size); see
Winship and Radbill (1994) for a discussion.13
private sector in works council incidence, we propose to focus on findings for
private-sector establishments (excluding agriculture) alone.
Table 4: Probit Estimates of Works Council Presence in the Private Sector
(excluding agriculture and not-for-profit organizations)
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(dummy: 1 if ≤ 5 years)
Legal status of firm
(dummy: 1 if family-name firm)
Foreign ownership
(dummy: 1 if foreign owner)
Covered by a collective agreement







Profit sharing scheme for employees
(dummy: 1 if yes)
Employee share ownership scheme
































































































Notes: Heteroscedastic-consistent t-values in parentheses. **,* denote statistical
significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, Waves 8 (western Germany) and 5 (eastern
Germany), 2000.14
Probit estimates for the entire private sector and its manufacturing and service
sector components are given in Table 4. It is apparent that the determinants of
works council presence differ as between manufacturing (including construction)
and services. But the big picture at least is the same for establishments from both
sectors with respect to firm size. Here, we observe the familiar inverse U-shaped
relation between number of employees and the probability of observing a works
council (see Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner, 1997). The same holds for the
impact of branch plant status, establishment age, the legal status of the firm,
foreign ownership, and coverage by a collective agreement. In each sector, and in
accordance with our priors, the probability of works council presence in young
establishments and family-name firms is lower, and it is higher in branch plants
and in establishments covered by a collective agreement, ceteris paribus. Note
that foreign-owned firms evince a higher probability of having a works council in
manufacturing and construction. This particular result might come as a surprise to
many, given popular opinion.
Material differences between services and the rest of the private sector are found
for variables that reflect workforce composition, namely, the shares of blue-collar
workers, part-time workers, and female workers. For manufacturing establish-
ments, only the negative effect of an increasing share of part-time workers on
works council presence is statistically significant at conventional levels. And for the
sample of service-sector establishments only the directional influence of the share
of female workers is as anticipated (and statistically significant). Expressed
another way, the coefficient estimate for the share of part-time workers is positive
(albeit insignificant), while the probability of observing a works council actually
decreases as the proportion of blue-collar workers increases. We have no expla-
nation for the latter seemingly perverse result.
As regards the effect of the (indirect) participation variables – namely, employee
profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes – the evidence is also
contrary to that reported in Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner (1997). That is to say,
the availability of share ownership mechanisms is associated with an increased
likelihood of observing works councils in both sectors. The same obtains for profit
sharing, at least in manufacturing. One possibility is that firms with works councils,
and perhaps more importantly works councilors themselves, have become less
averse to such employee involvement schemes in recent years, and that this
development has dominated any opposing tendency for such schemes to function
as an alternative to the mechanism of representative employee involvement.15
A final result is that the regional influence is not constant as between sectors.
Being located in eastern Germany increases the probability of works council pres-
ence in service-sector establishments while the opposite result holds for their
manufacturing counterparts.
Up to this point our discussion has devolved on issues of the statistical
significance of the estimated coefficients and the directional influence of the
covariates. But information on the extent of this influence – the issue of economic
significance – is even more important. Although a variable that has no statistically
significant impact can be ignored from an economic point of view, the opposite is
not true. That is to say, a variable that is highly statistically significant might have
no material impact. If, for example, the estimated probability of having a works
council diminishes by 0.1 percent when observed plant size falls from 250 to just
20 employees, we can ignore plant size in any discussion of works council
incidence, irrespective of a high level of statistical significance indicated by the
prob-value.
Unfortunately, the estimated coefficients from a probit model (or any other non-
linear model) cannot easily be used to make statements about the size of the
ceteris paribus effect of a change in the value of an exogenous variable (such as
an increase in the size of an establishment by, say, 5 persons) on the value of the
endogenous variable (here the probability of having a works council). This is be-
cause the size of the effect depends on both the starting level of the exogenous
variable under consideration and on the values of all other variables in the model
(see Long and Freese, 2001, 87ff.).
One way to ease interpretation of the estimates is to compute the estimated
values of the endogenous variable (the probability of having a works council) for a
plant with certain characteristics (38 employees, 24 percent blue-collar workers,
etc.), and then to see how a change in the value of one exogenous variable (such
as establishment size) changes the estimated probability. Where there are many
regressors, however, this procedure tends to produce results that are difficult to
survey. One solution is to construct a limited number of types of plant, using differ-
ent values of selected variables that are both statistically significant and economi-
cally important – for example, establishment size and collective bargaining cover-
age – while fixing the values of the other variables in the empirical model at their
sample means in the case of continuous variables (e.g. proportion of part-time
workers) or at the most common frequency for dichotomous variables (e.g. foreign
ownership).16
For expositional purposes, we focus here on the ceteris paribus influence of differ-
ences in establishment size, legal status (family-name firm) and coverage by a
collective agreement on the estimated probability of having a works council in
either manufacturing and construction or private services. In each sector, all three
variables are highly statistically significant in the estimations for works council
presence. Moreover, legal status and coverage by a collective agreement are
quite common outcomes. Thus, 33 (42) percent of all establishments in manu-
facturing and construction (private services) are family-name businesses, while 68
(53) percent of all establishments in manufacturing and construction (private serv-
ices) are covered by a collective agreement. In the simple simulation exercise
reported below, the above mentioned variables take different values whereas
these values are fixed for all other arguments. (The hypothetical establishment is
not a branch plant; it is not a young firm or foreign owned; it has neither a profit-
sharing scheme for employees nor an employee stock ownership plan; it is located
in western Germany and produces in the reference group industry; and the propor-
tions of blue-collar, part-time, and female employees are fixed at the respective
sample means.)
To start with, consider a plant from manufacturing and construction that is small
(having just 20 employees), a family-name firm, and not covered by a collective
agreement. Call this plant 1A. Using the results reported in the penultimate column
of Table 4, and fixing the values of the other variables in the manner stated above,
the estimated probability of having a works council for plant 1A is 0.30. If we
change the legal status to that of a non-family-name plant (call this plant 2A), the
estimated probability increases to 0.48. This example nicely illustrates the large
impact of the legal status of the entity on works council presence. In establishment
3A – identical to plant 2A in every respect other than being covered by a collective
agreement – this probability is 0.80. Evidently, the effect of collective agreement
coverage on the probability of observing a works council is huge.
To illustrate the role of establishment size, we identify three new plants – call them
1B, 2B, and 3B – that are identical to 1A, 2A, and 3A other than in their number of
employees. The new plants each employ 250 (rather than 20) employees. The
estimated probabilities of observing a works council in 1B, 2B, and 3B are 0.81,
0.91, and 0.99, respectively, much higher than for their smaller counterparts.
Clearly, establishment size is very important in this sector. As an aside, we note
that, taken literally, the estimated coefficients from our empirical model point to an
inverse U-shaped relation between number of employees and the probability of
works council presence. Accordingly, this probability should decline after some17
establishment size threshold: the estimated maximum value of this quadratic in
employment size is 21,010 employees. Only a handful of plants in our sample
have more employees. It follows that the results should only be interpreted as
indicating that works council presence increases with firm size but at a decreasing
rate.
We replicated the above simulations for service-sector establishments that were
designed as twins of plants 1A through 3B. The broad picture for the service
sector is quite similar to that for manufacturing. Thus, the probability of works
council presence is definitely lower in a family-name firm (0.06 in Firm 1A' com-
pared with 0.23 in Firm 2A'), and also higher in a firm covered by a collective
agreement (0.57 in Firm 3A'). Again, establishment size is important: the estimated
probabilities are 0.16, 0.43, and 0.77 for plants 1B', 2B', and 3B', respectively.
4. NEW WORKS COUNCILS:E XTENT AND DETERMINANTS
Following our investigation of the determinants of works council presence in 2000
we will now turn to the separate issue of works council introduction. Using data
from the IAB establishment panel, we identify newly established works councils
and investigate the circumstances of their formation.
To the best of our knowledge, this issue has nowhere been examined in the
literature.
8 Empirical evidence on formation is important, not least because a
central aim of the German government in revising the Works Constitution Act was
to foster the introduction of works councils in small firms and thereby shrink the
size of what was termed a 'codetermination-free zone' (see section I).
Information on works council presence for establishments in western and eastern
Germany is available from the 1996, 1998, and 2000 waves of the IAB establish-
ment panel. Comparing establishments in 1996 and 1998 (and those in 1998 with
2000) one can identify plants reporting no works council in the base year(s) that
introduced the entity sometime within the next two years. Thus, of the 2,321 plants
participating in both the 1996 and 1998 waves that reported no works council in
the former year, 121 (or 5.21 percent) claimed to have a council in 1998. The
8 Note, however, that it is touched upon in our earlier study of the effects of works councils on firm
performance (see Addison, Bellmann, Schnabel and Wagner 2002). There we applied a pro-
pensity score based Mahalanobis-distance approach to match plants, using a probit model of
works council introduction to compute the propensity score.18
corresponding values for the 1998 and 2000 waves are 2,563 and 145 (or 5.66
percent), respectively.
Works council formation, therefore, is a rare event in Germany. In what follows, we
use probit estimates of works council introduction to investigate the distinguishing
characteristics of plants with recently established councils. In the empirical model,
we also look at the ceteris paribus effects of variables (measured in the base year
of each of the two periods, 1996/98 and 1998/2000) that might be considered as
potential determinants of works council formation.
As was the case for works council presence, our main regressors capture struc-
tural and worker compositional elements. The former comprise a quadratic in
establishment size, branch plant status, establishment age (not available in 1998),
the legal status of the firm, coverage by a collective agreement, location in eastern
Germany, and industry affiliation. Justification for these arguments is identical to
that provided earlier. Again as before, the worker compositional variables are
intended to proxy a taste for collective representation on the part of employees.
The variables in question, the proportions of blue collar, part-time, and female
workers, are on this occasion supplemented by the share of shift workers
(available in 1996 and 1998 only).
Moreover, given the popular belief that works council introduction may reflect a
defensive reaction on the part of workers to some form of workplace crisis, we
include a measure of the establishments profit situation. This subjectively defined
variable takes the value of one if the management respondent reports the profit
situation to be either 'very good' or 'good', zero otherwise. Although this financial
performance variable might suffer from various shortcomings, we consider it a
valid indicator of overall business conditions in the establishment.
9
For the period 1996/98 information for each of the above variables is available for
1,950 establishments; 80 of which introduced a works council. For 1998/ 2000, the
respective values are 2,294 and 109 plants.
9 In analyzing works council formation, lack of information on employee profit-sharing schemes/
stock ownership plans and foreign ownership in the 1996 and 1998 waves precluded use of
these variables, each of which were employed in modeling works council presence (see Table 4).19
Table 5: Probit Estimates of Works Council Introduction
Variable No works council in
1996, but one in 1998
No works council in
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Notes: Heteroscedastic-consistent t-values in parentheses. **, * denote statisti-
cal significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. All variables are
for the first year indicated, either 1996 or 1998.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel.
Results of fitting the probit regressions to the data for 1996/98 and 1998/ 2000 are
provided in Table 5. In both periods, there is a positive association between estab-20
lishment size, branch plant status and coverage by a collective agreement, and
works council formation. There is also a consistently negative relation between
legal status and works council introduction. Both sets of result are in line with our
priors.
Contrary to folklore, there is no suggestion that overall business conditions (i.e.
profit situation) matter in either period. The same holds for each of the four worker
composition variables, and also for the establishment age argument (included in
the 1996/98 estimation alone for reasons of data availability).
For its part, location in eastern Germany reduces the probability of works council
introduction. However, this effect is statistically significant at conventional levels
only for the first period investigated.
To look at the economic significance of three of the variables found to be statis-
tically significant throughout – namely, establishment size, coverage by a
collective agreement, and legal status – a simulation exercise is performed that
mimics our procedure in the previous section. That is, we consider a hypothetical
plant with certain characteristics, compute the probability of works council
formation for this plant based on the relevant coefficient estimates (reported in
Table 5), and then alter the value of the variables under consideration sequentially
so as to illustrate their ceteris paribus impact.
The simulation uses the results for 1996/98, reported in the second column of
Table 5. The hypothetical plant 1A has 20 employees, is a family-name business,
and is not covered by collective agreement. Furthermore, this plant – and indeed
all the other hypothetical establishments considered here – is not a branch plant; it
is not a young plant; it has neither a 'very good' nor a 'good' profit situation; it is
located in western Germany and operates in the reference group industry; and has
proportions of blue-collar, part-time, female, and shift employees that are fixed at
their sample means. The estimated probability of introducing a works council for
Firm 1A is a tiny 0.025. Changing the legal status of the establishment firm (call
this establishment type 2A) raises the probability to 0.054. Despite the very
considerable increase in the likelihood of works council, it remains the case that
the probability value is low. In plant type 3A – identical to establishment 2A in all
respects other than collective agreement coverage –, the probability of works
council formation is 0.084, much higher than that for establishment type 2A but still
modest.21
To illustrate the contribution of establishment size, we compare our three types of
plants (1A, 2A, and 3A) with otherwise identical establishments that have 250
(rather than 20) employees, and which we duly designate as 1B, 2B, and 3B. The
estimated probability of observing works council introduction for the latter group
are 0.102, 0.181, and 0.248, respectively. These are much higher values than
obtained for the smaller comparators. As was the case for legal status and collec-
tive agreement coverage, establishment size is an important determinant of coun-
cil formation. Equally, however, the magnitude of the absolute values indicate that
the introduction of a works council is expected to be a rare event not only in small
plants but also in medium-sized establishments too.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has provided the most comprehensive information to date on the
incidence and coverage of German works councils by establishment size class
and by broad sector and region. Furthermore, it has offered an analysis of the
determinants of works council presence, supplementing this with information on
the frequency of new councils and the factors underpinning their formation.
Our basic findings are threefold. First of all, works councils are far from ubiquitous
in the firmament of smaller establishments. In 2000, only 9 percent (30 percent) of
all establishments with 5-20 employees (21-50 employees) had a works council.
The values are even lower when we single out the private sector. Given that
smaller plants comprise a large fraction of the total, works councils are found in
just 12.3 percent of German private sector-establishments with 5 or more
employees. Nevertheless, reflecting greater works council penetration in larger
establishments, a much higher proportion of German workers than German plants
are covered by works councils: 45.8 percent in the private sector, and 89.2 percent
in the public sector.
Second of all, works council presence is not random. Most importantly, in the
private sector it tends to be positively related to establishment size and coverage
by a collective agreement, and it is much lower in family-name businesses.
Finally, introduction of a new works council is a very rare event. Less than 6 per-
cent of all establishments in the IAB panel that did not have a works council in
1996 (1998) reported having one in 1998 (2000). The probability of observing new
councils is positively related to establishment size and coverage by a collective
agreement, and it is again much lower in family-name undertakings.22
Given the scarcity of detailed, representative, and contemporary information on
works council frequency, the descriptive evidence provided here has intrinsic
worth. Furthermore, it is relevant for at least two other reasons. Thus, the nonran-
dom nature of works council presence/formation means that potentially serious
biases characterize point estimates of the work council effect on firm performance
derived from OLS estimation. With a few exceptions – recent examples being the
very different methodological approaches of Hübler and Jirjahn (2001) and
Addison, Bellman, Schnabel, and Wagner (2002) – the literature has treated works
councils as exogenous. Moreover, the rare events nature of works council intro-
duction in hitherto uncovered plants, and the core role of establishment size in this
regard, make it highly improbable that the central aim of the new Works Constitu-
tion Act will be met. That aim is to shrink the extent of the codetermination free
zone, which is largely made up of smaller establishments. Moreover, given the
important role of bargaining coverage for works council presence, the steadily
falling number of establishments covered by collective agreements reported by
Kohaut and Schnabel (2001) is likely to increase this works council free zone.
A postscript is in order. After this paper was completed, the first round of regular
works council elections under the aegis of new law was held (between March 1
and May 31, 2002). Time will tell whether or not the legislative changes and the
intensive PR campaign of the union movement will lead to a large number of new
works councils in small and medium-sized establishments. Based on our findings,
we doubt this will happen. But we plan carefully to monitor such developments
– and the economic effects of new councils – in future work.23
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Appendix Table: Probit Estimates of Works Council Presence






(dummy: 1 if yes)
Establishment age
(dummy: 1 if ≤ 5 years)
Legal form of firm
(dummy: 1 if family-owned firm)
Foreign ownership
(dummy: 1 if foreign ownership)
Covered by a collective agreement







Profit sharing scheme for employees
(dummy: 1 if yes)
Employee share ownership scheme






























































































Notes: Heteroscedastic-consistent t-values in parentheses. **, * denote statisti-
cal significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 8 (western Germany) and 5 (eastern
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